

The Second Generation in Belgium

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A growing proportion of second-generation Moroccan and Turkish youngsters in Belgium are moving on to higher secondary education and beyond. This trend is greater among Moroccan youngsters than among their Turkish peers. Turkish girls in particular are still married off at a young age, which inevitably affects their educational opportunities. Despite higher participation rates for youngsters from immigrant backgrounds, the educational gap with Belgian pupils and students remains wide. This is largely attributable to differences in socioeconomic background. It appears that the concentration of second-generation immigrant pupils in certain schools is also a major explanatory factor. Despite their increased participation in education, second-generation immigrants are still not well represented in the labor market and they are, moreover, employed mostly in less favorable segments of that market. An interesting development among second-generation immigrants is the polarization that is taking place in relation to the significance of Islam. A growing number of second-generation youngsters are opting for a more secular way of life, while an increasingly large group is choosing Islamist ideologies or at least a more conscious form of Islam. For young people of the second generation, who often have little to hold on to socially, Islamism can provide a transparent, supportive, and all-embracing frame of reference.

Unlike many other European nations, Belgium has not been a typical emigration or immigration country since it gained independence in 1830. In fact, immigration flows to Belgium only began in 1920s. Apart from immigrants from neighboring countries, Belgium also took in workers from Central and Southern Europe. Two countries stand out in this respect: Poland and, even more so, Italy. Much of this immigration was directed towards areas with heavy industry, especially the mining and steel industries of Wallonia, which had developed in the early twentieth century. In the 1960s, the diver-

sification of economic activity, particularly in Flanders, led to a new spatial distribution of newcomers. This immigration flow, primarily of Moroccans and Turks, was largely directed towards Flemish cities and the capital, Brussels, rather than to the mining areas in Wallonia. The labor migration of Moroccans and Turks started in 1964, following Belgium's signing of bilateral agreements with Morocco and Turkey. Today, the majority of foreigners in Flanders and in the Brussels Capital Region live within the triangle of Brussels-Antwerp-Ghent and in towns in Limburg Province.

TABLE 1
THE POPULATION OF BELGIUM (JANUARY 1, 2000)

	Flemish Region	Walloon Region	Brussels Region	Belgium
EU citizens (non-Belgian)	164,569	258,631	140,356	563,556
Turks	34,667	16,130	18,386	69,183
Other Europeans	14,965	8,640	10,687	34,292
Moroccans	42,266	17,440	62,278	121,984
Other Non Europeans	37,183	29,006	41,906	108,095
Total Foreigners	293,650	329,847	273,613	897,110
Belgian inhabitants of foreign origin (01-01-1998)	411,732 (7.0%)	532,875 (16.0%)	369,618 (38.8%)	1,314,225 (12.9%)
Belgians	5,646,601	3,009,669	685,705	9,341,975
Total Belgium	5,940,251 (58%)	3,339,516 (32.6%)	959,318 (9.4%)	10,239,085 (100%)

Source: NIS, Population Statistics

The proportion of foreigners in Belgium increased from 4.3 percent in 1947 to 8.9 percent in 1981, and subsequently stabilized at around 9 percent of the total population (Martens and Caestecker, 2001:99). However, this figure excludes a significant segment of second-generation immigrants as it only takes into account citizens who have not (yet) acquired Belgian nationality. In 1998, residents of foreign origin – including third-generation immigrants and those who had acquired Belgian nationality – accounted for 12.9 percent of the Belgian population (Martens and Caestecker, 2001:100). The distribution of this foreign population group in Belgium is estimated as follows: 28 percent in the Brussels Capital Region, 31 percent in the Flemish region and 41 percent in the Walloon Region (APS/VRIND, 2000).

However, apart from these figures for 1998, accurate data on the size of the various ethnic groups, including those who have acquired Belgian citizenship and second-generation immigrants, are hard to come by. Thus far, the only information that is directly and systematically registered in Belgium concerns citizens' nationality, not their ethnic origin. In other words, the figures put forward by the National Institute of Statistics are of little use if one wants

to determine the size of the population of foreign origin (Swyngedouw, 1999:40; Van de Velde, 2002; Geets, Vanderwaeren and Timmerman, 2001). Therefore, any researcher with a particular interest in the size of the foreign-origin population group will need to find creative solutions. The Flemish Employment Agency (Vlaamse Dienst voor Arbeidsbemiddeling en Beroepsopleiding, VDAB), for instance, developed a software program for name identification. This program is able to recognize Maghrebian and Turkish names in the Belgian and European Union population. The system was tested on the population registers of twelve Flemish municipalities. It found that, at the end of 1998, the total number of ethnic Maghrebian and Turkish residents aged between 18 and 64 in those twelve municipalities was 57 percent above the official nationality-based figures (VDAB, 2001b). The official figure for 20 to 21 year olds was actually 2.4 times lower than the figure calculated on the basis of the ethnic name recognition system. We can safely assume that all these young Belgians of Moroccan and Turkish descent belong to the second generation.

TURKISH AND MOROCCAN COMMUNITIES IN BELGIUM

In the context of Belgium, a distinction can be made between “old” and “new” immigration flows: the former was exclusively European and primarily drew from populations with a Catholic background, whereas the latter is non-European and mainly Muslim. Today, the two largest non-EU population groups in Belgium are the Moroccan and the Turkish communities. Although Belgium proclaimed a moratorium on immigration in 1974, the Moroccan and Turkish populations continued to grow steadily in subsequent years. The majority of these immigrants after 1974 came to Belgium on the basis of family reunification or, in the past decade, family formation programs. Between 1994 and 1998, 77.5 percent of Moroccan and 75.3 percent of Turkish newcomers in Flanders were aged between 15 and 34. By 1998, there were 125,082 Moroccans (or 14% of the foreign population) and 70,701 Turks (or 7.9% of the foreign population) living in Belgium (Timmerman *et al.*, 1999). However, the total number of inhabitants of Moroccan and Turkish origin – including third-generation immigrants and those who had acquired Belgian nationality – was 188,000 and 109,000 respectively (Martens and Caestecker, 2001:100). The majority of these Moroccan and Turkish immigrants come from rural areas in their homelands. The majority of Turkish immigrants in Belgium hail from the province of Afyon or bordering provinces. Other areas of emigration to Belgium are situated to the

east of Ankara and along the Black Sea coast. More so than immigration from Turkey, Moroccan emigration is more restricted to a specific region: most Moroccans in Belgium come from the province in the Rif (Nador), while a quarter hail from the province of Tanger. In all, over three quarters of ethnic Moroccans in Belgium have their roots in Northern Morocco (Surkyn and Reniers, 1996:46-49). The highest concentrations of Turkish immigrants are found in the Flemish provinces of East Flanders (in cities such as Ghent, St. Niklaas and Lokeren) and Limburg, and in Brussels. As for immigrants from the Maghreb, they have settled mostly in urban areas, including in the Brussels Capital Region and in Antwerp (Flanders).

The educational attainment of first-generation Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Belgium is low (*see* Table 2).

TABLE 2
FIRST-GENERATION TURKISH AND MOROCCAN IMMIGRANTS IN BELGIUM
BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL (IN %).

	Lower Secondary		
	Education	Primary Education	No Diploma
Turks	33.0	52.8	14.1
Moroccans	22.8	21.5	55.7

Source: Lesthaeghe, 2000:74

In general, Turkish immigrants of the first generation are better educated than their Moroccan peers. Over 50 percent of the latter had obtained no formal qualifications prior to emigration to Belgium. The educational attainment of first-generation immigrants from Morocco and Turkey varies considerably with age: the younger they are, the better educated they are (Reniers, 2000:74-75). This generally low level of educational attainment largely determines their ability to participate effectively in Belgian society. Moreover, it also impacts on the educational level of the second generation.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND GENERATION

Unlike first-generation immigrants, those belonging to the second generation did not choose to emigrate and live in another country, so that their frame of reference is inevitably different. By second and following generations, we mean those who were born in Belgium or who arrived here at pre-school age (younger than 7) and whose parents or grandparents are of foreign origin. They are Belgian citizens irrespective of their nationality (Timmerman, *et al.*, 1999:3). As in the case of their Belgian peers, the educational and labor-market opportunities of second-generation youngsters are determined by their

social, economic and cultural capital. Because of their sociohistorical background of immigration from relatively underdeveloped areas, this capital is often insufficient to participate adequately in Western society. Especially in an urban context, the huge contrast between the overwhelming supply of merchandise, the youngsters' limited spending power, and the weak social position of their parents is salient. In recent decades, the proportion of immigrants in the total population of youngsters has increased significantly. As they are often housed in cramped conditions and because of their sociocultural backgrounds, they tend to spend a great deal of time out in the streets. The greater visibility of immigrant youth in the streets can sometimes give rise to tension with local natives (Foblets, Hubeau and De Muynck, 1997:98). Young Moroccan males, particularly, are often held responsible for rising street crime. This widely spread suspicion was confirmed in the so-called 'Van San Report,' which provoked much debate and controversy (Van San and Leerkes, 2001). The events of September 11, 2001 further reinforced the negative image of Muslim ethnic minority communities as potential breeding places for extremism and terrorism.

Much research has been carried out in the field of immigration and ethnic minorities, but relatively few studies focused on the second generation as such. Nevertheless, some recent studies do make explicit reference to this subgroup. Political participation on the part of foreigners, for example, has been an active research field since the second half of the 1990s. As voting rights are conditional upon Belgian citizenship, this line of research mainly concerns second-generation immigrants and naturalized individuals, who usually also belong to the second or subsequent generations. These studies show that the voting behavior of the allochthonous population is similar to that of the low-educated native population (Swyngedouw, 1999; Boussetta, 1998; Martiniello, 1995).

Educational research, especially studies focusing on Moroccan and Turkish youngsters, also concern the second generation, even though this is not always mentioned explicitly. Today, most Belgian youngsters of Moroccan and Turkish descent were born in Belgium, so they belong to second and following generations (Hermans, 1994; Timmerman, 1999). Several studies in this field have looked specifically at the issues of language (Jaspaert, 1996; Leman, 1999; Van den Branden and Van Avermaet, 2001; Verlot, 2001).

More recently, research has been carried out on the well being of second-generation immigrants. It found that women of the second generation were relatively well informed about social and welfare institutions (Timmer-

man, 1999). An alarming observation is that Moroccan and, to a lesser extent, Turkish second-generation immigrants are overrepresented in the populations of youth penitentiaries. In other words, they are associated more easily with crime than other youngsters. On the other hand, they are on the whole underrepresented as clients in the welfare sector (Geets, Vanderwaeren and Timmerman, 2001; Vanderwaeren and Timmerman, 2001).

THE SECOND GENERATION AND EDUCATION

Before discussing the position of second-generation immigrants in education, we briefly consider Belgium's educational system. Children generally start pre-school when they are two and a half years old. Compulsory education begins at the age of six. In the present article, we focus on second generation youth (over 15) who were attending pre-school and primary school in the 1980s. In the 1980s, it was still common practice for Turkish and Moroccan parents not to send their children to pre-school. A study by Hermans (1994:87) found that over two thirds of second-generation Moroccan boys, who went to pre-school in the early 1980s, started school at age two and a half. Others started a year later. This situation has gradually changed, and now almost all children go to school from the earlier age.

In the 1980s, second language education programs in primary schools were rare. In the late 1980s, there was only one project of real significance. Large-scale second language education in primary schools only truly developed in the following decade.

After primary school, at the age of twelve, children move on to two 'orientation' years in secondary school. However, the most important selection follows at the age of fourteen, when children have a choice between vocational training, technical training and general secondary education. Nevertheless, a minority of children (10%) are selected for vocational training from the age of twelve. These are mostly children who have had to repeat at least one year of primary school. Turkish and Moroccan children are overrepresented in this category.

Since Belgium is a federal state, the Flemish and Walloon communities can formulate and implement educational priority policies independently. The school system is, however, very similar in the two regions.

Educational Priority Policy in Flanders

In 1985, the Flemish Ministry of Education concluded that the disadvantage that immigrant children experience at the beginning of their school careers

compromises their further educational opportunities. In an effort to remedy this situation, the Flemish government launched a number of education policies in the following years. These policies are the Educational Priority Policy (1991), the Nondiscrimination Policy (1994), and the Equal Opportunities Policy (since the early 1990s), which allow schools to focus special attention on weak pupils, referred to as target-group pupils. Currently, three kinds of initiatives can be distinguished: the allocation of extra teaching periods to schools; the promotion of intercultural education; and the stimulation of Dutch-language acquisition. Schools can participate in the above initiatives if they can demonstrate that they reach the intended target groups and fulfill certain criteria.

According to the Educational Priority Policy, a target-group pupil is a pupil whose grandmother on the mother's side was not born in Belgium and did not obtain Belgian or Dutch nationality, and whose mother attended school maximally until the end of the school year in which she turned age 18. The policy places much emphasis on the instruction of Dutch as a second language. Indeed, the improvement of all pupils' fluency in the school language (*i.e.*, Dutch) is one of four pillars on which this policy is founded. The others are the promotion of intercultural education, prevention/remediation, and the enhancement of parental commitment.

In addition to the above-mentioned initiatives, the Policy on Extension of Care, which was launched during the 1993-1994 school year, allows primary schools to provide special attention and care for weak and deprived pupils. Under this policy, target-group pupils are defined differently. In this context, a target-group pupil is a pupil whose mother has no secondary school diploma, or who belongs to a one-parent family, or whose parents are both unemployed. This implies that the factor of ethnicity is no longer taken into account. Still, we may assume that a large proportion of the target population does consist of second or subsequent generation immigrants. On the basis of figures regarding these target-group pupils, we deduce that approximately 5.5 percent of pupils in Flemish schools are of foreign origin (regardless of whether or not they have obtained Belgian nationality). The Educational Priority Policy and the Policy on the Extension of Care are directed mainly at primary education.

The impact of the above policies on the educational attainment of children from ethnic minority backgrounds is still unclear. So far, little work has been conducted on the evaluation of policies related to the position of ethnic minorities in education (Verlot, 2001a:198-199).

Educational Policy in Wallonia

Belgium's Francophone community government and, for that matter, the government of the Brussels Capital Region pursue an integration policy aimed at improving the liveability of, and harmonious coexistence in, underprivileged neighborhoods (Verlot, 2001b:94). In its integration policy, the French community government used to emphasize socioeconomic aspects, whereby the starting point was that all citizens should be treated equally, irrespective of whether or not they are suffering from deprivation. Since 1996, two new perspectives have been added. First, it was decided that equality should be achieved by creating equal opportunities, rather than merely through equal treatment (Verlot, 2001b:94-96). Second, unlike in previous policies, cultural diversity was now recognized, and it was considered a means to realize better citizenship, much like socioeconomic improvement (Verlot, 2001b:96). Nonetheless, the ideas of the administrative elites of Wallonia are, on the whole, based on two assumptions. The first is the egalitarian-civil postulate, which states that every citizen is entitled to equal opportunities. The second is what Verlot (2001b:105) calls a majority perspective, whereby it is assumed that the French culture has a universal value that is capable of spanning and integrating the cultures of (ethnic) minorities. This statement suggests that, thus far, support for the idea of cultural diversity is ambiguous. However, in the 1970s, the intake of foreign pupils in schools in Wallonia created unexpected problems. At that time, there was still very much a notion that immigrants would one day return to their home country, which led to the teaching of the language and culture of origin (ELCO). However, this idea was later abandoned, and the program was cancelled. From 1985 to 1987, French has held a monopoly as the language of communication. According to Verlot (2001b:224), any attempt to open up the egalitarian monocultural educational model and transform it into a truly intercultural form of education has been in vain (Verlot, 2001b:119-123).

THE EDUCATIONAL POSITION OF THE SECOND GENERATION

The 1994-1996 surveys on Migration History and Social Mobility (MHSM) are the only surveys providing recent national data for both Wallonia and Flanders regarding the educational position of second-generation immigrants. These surveys were conducted exclusively among men.

We shall first consider the achieved level of education by second-generation immigrants. All surveys are based on cluster samples, whereby clusters are municipalities that were randomly selected from all municipalities with a Turkish or Moroccan community of at least 100 (according to the 1991 census). Individuals were randomly selected in the foreign population registers of these municipalities (Lesthaeghe, 2000a:56).

TABLE 3
ACHIEVED LEVEL OF MOROCCAN AND TURKISH SECOND-GENERATION MEN AGED
18 YEARS AND OLDER

Observed school levels	Moroccan	Turkish
Unqualified	0%	0%
Primary	17%	9%
Lower secondary (BSO)	39%	37%
Higher secondary (ASO; TSO)	36%	50%
Higher education	8%	4%
N	194	272

Source: HMSM Survey Data, 1994-1996.

Half of the second-generation youngsters achieve a low level of education, though the Turkish youngsters seem to perform slightly better than their Moroccan peers. Table 3 only shows the level of education of those who already graduated or left school. It does not tell us anything about the youngsters still in school, which by consequence can be misleading for our determination of the educational position of the second generation (Neels, 2000:247). Moroccan men of the second generation have higher levels of school attendance (37%) in the age category between 18 and 30 compared to second-generation Turks (16%). If we combine the groups who left school and those who did not, another picture emerges. To this end, Neels (2000:248) constructed a life-table that takes account of already achieved educational levels by students. Furthermore, he calculated the probabilities that students would achieve a certain educational level, given their present position.

TABLE 4
ADJUSTED EDUCATIONAL LEVELS FOR MOROCCAN AND TURKISH SECOND-GENERATION MEN
18 YEARS AND OLDER

Adjusted school levels	Moroccan	Turkish
Unqualified	0%	0%
Primary	11%	8%
Lower secondary	29%	33%
Higher secondary	37%	48%
Higher education	23%	11%
N	293	321

Source: HMSM Survey Data, 1994-1996.

We notice that, in this adjusted table, differences between second-generation Turks and Moroccans are much smaller. The only significant difference concerns the level of attainment in higher education. Moroccans now appear to be outperforming the Turks. In fact, the probability that they will complete higher education is twice as high as that of Turks. The differences between Turks and Moroccans are due to the fact that Moroccans are more likely to opt for general subjects at the secondary and post-secondary school levels. Turks, on the other hand, are more likely to leave school after graduating from technical and vocational training programs at the secondary level (Neels and Stoop, 2000:289). Another plausible negative impact arises from the fact that Turkish second-generation youngsters are less likely than their Moroccan peers to have studied exclusively in Belgium. According to the MHSM surveys of 1994-1996, just 87 percent of second-generation Turks had studied exclusively in Belgium, compared to 97 percent of second-generation Moroccans.¹ In other words, 13 percent of the Turkish second generation also spent some time at school in Turkey. This often has a negative effect on the educational careers of these youngsters. In fact, they are two times more likely than those who study exclusively in Belgium not to obtain a secondary school diploma and three times less likely to move on to higher education.

The only available figure for second-generation women, based on the 1991 census, suggests that, on the whole, second-generation Moroccan girls reach higher educational levels than do second-generation Turkish girls. In the 20-to-25 age group, there are twice as many Moroccan girls as Turkish girls who are studying (Lesthaeghe, 1996:211).

The advantage of the Moroccan second generation over the Turkish second generation is surprising, given that the first-generation Moroccan parents are lower-schooled than first-generation Turkish parents (*see* Table 5).

In view of the different policies towards immigrants, it is also interesting to look at regional differences between Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels (Neels, 2000:248). Wallonia has more or less adopted the French Republican model of assimilation of the immigrant population, while Flanders has adopted the multicultural model that is also applied in the Netherlands. We shall consider the Turkish community only, because the number of Moroccans in Wallonia is too small to allow for a reliable comparison.

¹The second generation accounts for approximately 25 percent of Moroccan and Turkish respondents.

TABLE 5
ADJUSTED EDUCATIONAL LEVELS FOR TURKISH SECOND-GENERATION MEN 18 YEARS
AND OLDER BY REGION

	Flanders	Wallonia	Brussels
Unqualified	0%	0%	0%
Primary school	7%	7%	9%
Lower secondary	31%	34%	35%
Higher secondary	52%	47%	44%
Higher education	10%	12%	13%
Total	143	75	103

Source: HMSM Survey Data, 1994-1996.

Surprisingly, there is almost no difference between the three regions. The divergent integration models seem to have little effect on the educational position of the second generation in Flanders and Wallonia. It should be noted in this respect that, while there are considerable regional differences in terms of the integration model applied, the educational system is more or less the same all over Belgium.

Explaining the Educational Position of the Second Generation

The educational gap between second-generation Turks and Moroccans on the one hand and the Belgian peer group on the other is due to differences in their primary as well as their secondary school pathways. For one thing, a relatively large proportion of Turkish and Moroccan children are required to repeat one or more years at primary school. At the end of the first year of primary school, around 9 percent of native pupils are a year behind schedule, compared to 26.4 percent of foreign pupils. By the sixth year of primary school, the proportion of repeaters among children from ethnic backgrounds will have increased to 37.8 percent. In fact, as much as 9 percent of the foreign-background pupils are two years behind schedule at the end of primary school (Mahieu, 2001:6). One of the reasons these children are unable to keep up with the learning pace at school is that they have insufficient command of the school language. Hermans (1994:87,88), for example, found that second-generation children who had not attended pre-school were more likely to report difficulties in second language acquisition. Children who started going to pre-school when they were two and a half all felt they had learned the language quickly and without difficulty, even though it was completely new to them. Another factor that seems to be of great significance for the degree of success at primary school is the nature of the school in question. Children who went to a school with few immigrant children reported that they had received much help and support from teachers. One of the successful Moroccan boys in the research by Hermans (1994) put it as follows:

In the beginning I had more difficulties than other children. But the teacher gave me extra guidance. There were only two or three immigrant children in the class. If 80 percent of children were Moroccans with problems like us, the teachers couldn't have given us all that much attention.

Other children reported the opposite situation. In some cases, there was just one Belgian student in the entire class. These children reported that class disturbances were a common occurrence and that the teacher could not cope with them as a group. Roosens (1995), in an overview of different studies of immigrant children in education, asserts that attending a so-called 'concentration' school (*i.e.*, a school with a high proportion of immigrant pupils) has a negative effect on the school careers of second-generation children. They are more likely to have to repeat and to end up in vocational training. Roosens refers to the problem of teacher burnout in these schools, where teachers hold low expectations for both the immigrant children and their parents (1995:17).

After primary school, children usually move on to two orientation years in secondary school. When these orientation years have been completed, most native pupils opt for general secondary education (ASO), while a smaller number choose technical secondary school (TSO). Few move on to vocational training (BSO). BSO prepares children directly for the labor market, while TSO provides a more theoretically-oriented education. In the case of second-generation children, the situation is exactly the opposite. They are overrepresented in BSO, particularly in the study options 'central heating and sanitary fittings,' 'electrical installations,' 'hairdressing' and 'nursing.' From BSO, pupils can only progress to a *cycle supérieur* (*i.e.*, intermediary-level vocational training), but few actually take this step. Moreover, those who do often fail (Hermans, 1994; Timmerman 1999). In TSO, Turkish and Moroccan children are overrepresented in the branches of 'electromechanics,' 'commerce' and especially in 'car mechanics and bodywork.' Moroccan and Turkish youngsters are, for that matter, generally overrepresented in study branches offering poor employment prospects. BSO schools and, to a lesser extent, TSO schools in major urban areas are typically concentration schools where the majority of the pupils are from low socioeconomic backgrounds. Many Moroccan boys get into trouble at these schools: they skip classes and hang out on the street with peers, lose interest in their studies, get into conflict with their teachers, and get involved with street gangs. At the end of the school year, they are quite often expelled so that they have to start the next year at a different school. This story often repeats itself until the end of compulsory school age (18 years). Hermans has demonstrated that educational or guid-

ance institutions take very little corrective action when youngsters exhibit maladaptive behavior or stray onto the path to delinquency (1995:35). A large proportion of Turkish girls also leaves school without a diploma, but for different reasons. The life-projects of a considerably large group of Turkish girls are, as Timmerman (1999:136-137) puts it, incompatible with a long educational trajectory. Some girls become engaged or even get married at the age of sixteen, while still at school. In the eyes of their parents, their role as future wives and homemakers is more important than their education. Especially from the fourth year of vocational education, many girls appear to be more preoccupied with engagement and marriage than with school, which affects the classroom climate very negatively (Timmerman, 1999:91).

A growing group of pupils are successful at school. Studies by Hermans (1994) and Timmerman (1999) explicitly set out in search of factors that contribute to their success. Avoiding concentration schools seems to be an important strategy, and one in which the parents play a significant role. Parents of successful students quite deliberately choose primary schools with fewer immigrant children. Children who avoid concentration schools are usually well prepared for the orientation years and therefore more likely to move on to general secondary education (*cf.* Crul, 2000). In the study by Timmerman, it emerged that Turkish girls who attend ASO are more likely to mix with Belgian middle-class girls. They thus become better informed about local society and begin to develop networks of their own, in addition to the networks of their families. Hermans (1994:143) reports that the successful Moroccan boys in ASO were often supported by their Belgian, Spanish and Italian peers (*cf.* Crul, 2000). Timmerman (1999) demonstrates that, unlike other Turkish girls, those attending what one might call 'elite' schools are intent on postponing marriage and pursuing their studies. They no longer feel at ease with the conservative atmosphere in the Turkish community. One Turkish student in the research by Timmerman (1999:118) puts it as follows:

To fully participate in Belgian society and follow the rules of the Turkish community is impossible. Integration presupposes emancipation. The Turkish community is not ready for that.

These Turkish girls increasingly orient themselves towards secular urban culture in Turkey. They observe that young educated females in Turkey have a much broader array of possibilities in their socioprofessional lives (Timmerman, 1995:30). Both Hermans (1994) and Timmerman (1999:124-125) stress the role of the parents in determining the degree of success children enjoy in education. Hermans puts great emphasis on discipline, guidance and

encouragement on the part of the parents. According to Timmerman (1999:124-125), mothers play an important role in encouraging their daughters. Roosens (1995) calls this 'genuine cultural innovation.' Some mothers attribute greater importance to the academic careers of their daughters than to the traditional requirement for them to become spouses, mothers and daughters-in-law.

The proportion of Turkish and Moroccan students who are successfully moving on to higher education is rising. In the Moroccan community, boys and girls are equally likely to participate in higher education. Turkish and Moroccan boys often opt for different subjects than girls. Girls mostly choose healthcare, commercial sciences or business administration, while male students are most likely to go for industrial sciences and technology. Dropout rates among Moroccan and Turkish students are much higher than among Belgian students. In the first year, the dropout rate among Turkish girls in particular is very high. However, the figures appear not to allow for differentiation between first- and subsequent-generation students (De Meester and Mahieu, 2000:23). Tutors point out that a relatively high proportion of immigrant students drop out in the course of the year, before exams have been taken. Hermans (1994:96-97) has demonstrated that most students lack the kind of information they need to choose a good course of study. His research has shown that three quarters of all students switch to a different subject after one or two years of study. This makes them lose time and motivation.

ENTRANCE INTO THE LABOR MARKET

Unemployment rates among Moroccans and Turks are generally above average. Figures from the national employment agency (Rijksdienst Voor Arbeidsvoorziening, RVA)² show, for example, that on June 30, 2001, some 20.6 percent of Turkish and 17.3 percent of Moroccan workers in Belgium were benefit-entitled full-time unemployed persons, as compared to 9.9 percent of Belgian workers. Since 1995, unemployment among the population of foreign origin has increased continuously, despite the spectacular overall drop in the number of job-seekers in recent years. In Flanders, the number of autochthonous unemployed job-seekers dropped by almost 50 percent between 1995 and 2000 (from 258,287 to 135,585; VDAB, 2001a). Figures for the twelve Flemish municipalities used in the VDAB-program show that

²Calculations based on RVA, *Maandelijks Bulletin* and NIS, *Bevolkingstatistieken*.

27.4 percent of the male ethnic Maghrebian and Turkish population aged between 18 and 50 are unemployed, compared to an unemployment rate of 5.5 percent among ethnic Belgians.

Data concerning the second generation are scarce: the only figures available are from the 1991 census, and much has changed since then. In 1991, only second-generation youngsters with a very short educational career had entered into the labor market. In the next table, we consider the observed and the expected occupational status of second-generation immigrants. The expected occupational status is calculated on the basis of the status held by native Belgians who belong to the same age group, have the same place of residence, and have enjoyed a similar level of education as the second-generation Moroccans and Turks in the table.

Unemployment among second-generation immigrants is very high.

TABLE 6
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF TURKISH AND MOROCCAN SECOND-GENERATION MEN AGED 18 TO 29:
OBSERVED AND EXPECTED DISTRIBUTIONS

	Turkish (obs.)	Turkish (exp.)	Moroccan (obs.)	Moroccan (exp.)	Native
Unemployed	38%	15%	37%	13%	10%
Non-skilled labor	19%	24%	23%	21%	20%
Skilled labor	32%	39%	25%	32%	31%
Higher occupation	11%	22%	15%	34%	39%

Source: 1991 Census Data

Some 40 percent of second-generation men are out of work, which is four times the unemployment rate found among Belgian youngsters. Unemployment figures for second-generation women are even higher: a massive 60 percent of second-generation Turkish women and almost half of second-generation Moroccan women were unemployed in 1991 (Lesthaeghe, 1996:224). Moreover, the duration of unemployment is 30 percent longer among young Belgians of foreign origin than among native Belgians (Neels and Stoop, 2000:305). On the positive side, we note that men of the second generation who have passed the hurdle of unemployment are more likely than men from the in-between generation to find skilled labor or be employed in higher-status occupations (Neels and Stoop, 2000:309).

The difference between observed and expected unemployment in Table 10 provides insight into the extent to which unemployment among the second generation is caused by the typical characteristics of this population group. It appears that only one third of unemployment among second-generation Moroccans is occasioned by the combination of age, place of resi-

dence and educational level. Unemployment among this group is three times higher than expected. Neels and Stoop have demonstrated that the gap between the observed and the expected occupational status is bigger for the second generation than for the first and in-between generations (Neels and Stoop, 2000:296). Labor motivation, the strength of social networks and discrimination are probably important explanatory factors in this respect.

An interesting study has been carried out in Flanders on discrimination in the labor market (VDAB, 2001a,b). It reveals that employers in Flanders base staff recruitment decisions on ethnic criteria rather than on the curriculum or the abilities of applicants. Especially Moroccans, Turks and South Europeans are confronted with discrimination in the labor market. The study also shows that employers' racial prejudice towards immigrant women is less serious than that towards immigrant men and that it becomes less as the educational level of the applicant increases (VDAB, 2001a,b). It is widely acknowledged that Moroccan and Turkish women are, generally speaking, less likely than men to fall victim to racial discrimination. This is probably due to a combination of factors. A first explanation is that Muslim women are less visible and less involved in the public domain than are Muslim men. A second, probably more important, element is that the negative stereotype that exists towards Moroccan and Turkish males does not apply to females from those communities (Timmerman, 2000b).

THE SECOND GENERATION AND ISLAM

While public life in Turkish and, to a lesser degree, Moroccan society is secularized and therefore quite similar to Western public life, this is not the case for family and community life (Cammaert, 1985; Hermans, 1994; Timmerman, 1999). Islam plays an important role in the lives of second-generation Moroccans and Turks in Belgium. Moreover, it would appear that the role of religion is increasing rather than decreasing. The majority of the Turkish and Moroccan respondents in the 1994-1995 MHSM survey assert that Islam is gaining in importance in daily life (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2000:144). Likewise, Islamism – by which we mean the use of Islam for political purposes – has gained in popularity among youngsters of the second generation. Islamism can provide a transparent, supportive and all-embracing frame of reference. In a context of unredeemed expectations and frustration, the appeal of Islamism can be great. To many young people of the second generation, the choice for a militant Islamic model presents itself as a more familiar and legitimate alternative than Western frames of reference (Timmerman,

2000c). On the basis of the 1994-95 MHSM survey, we conclude that polarization is occurring, especially in the case of the Turkish second generation. The survey reveals that, on the one hand, the proportion of secularized people is growing, while on the other, second-generation men are more likely than men from previous generations or men who have arrived more recently in Belgium to be attracted towards Islamist variants. In the Moroccan population, the situation is less clear, though again there is a tendency towards polarization among the second generation (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2000:140-142).

We distinguish in this context between Islamist variants and so-called 'folk Islam.' The term folk Islam refers to the set of beliefs that the first generation brought along from their country of origin. It is often ecstatic, saint-invoking and mystical, and it has little in common with the rule-oriented orthodox Islam practiced by the elites. Fundamental to this folk Islamic worldview are the notions of patrilineality and segregation of the sexes, which find expression in an all-encompassing discourse on honor and shame (Delaney, 1991). In order to understand why second-generation Muslims are attracted to Islamism, it should be noted that the ambiguity between Western and Islamic value systems is much smaller in the case of Islamism than in the case of folk Islam. Questions about the desirability of Western ideas become redundant in Islamism. Unlike the folk Islamic worldview, Islamism rejects the Western model outright. While it incorporates many modern Western elements in relation to education, technology, political and social organization, and even personal behavior, it does not regard them as Western (Roy, 1992).

According to Gellner (1983:76), Islam is ideally prepared for a place in modern society because it is represented both in the "High Culture," through orthodox Islam, and in the "Low Culture," through folk Islam. High Islam has several characteristics (including scripturalism, pluralism, puritanism, individualism, rule-orientation, a low loading of magic, an aversion to disorderly folk practices, and mystical indulgence) that make it very suitable as a worldview in a modern urban environment. It fits into an anonymous mobile society. If Islamism is well suited to an urban environment and attractive to people who are looking for an alternative, it is potentially much more closely in line with the lifestyle of the second generation than with that of the first generation. It can provide second-generation youth with answers to the existential questions of life. As other religious ideologies, it succeeds in giving meaning to profound human suffering, sickness, loss and death (Toprak,

1987:221). Secular worldviews are less successful in interpreting the often-unacceptable conditions of human existence.

Milli Görüs is most representative of Turkish Islamism in Belgium. The organization, with headquarters in Cologne, has become well established in Europe. Most Turkish mosques in Belgium are still associated with the Diyanet, though a significant number are now controlled by Milli Görüs. Besides controlling and monopolizing all religious activities in the Turkish Republic, the Diyanet also tries to govern Turkish immigrant communities in Europe (Dassetto, 1990:192). In Belgium, the Diyanet represents the official Turkish attitude towards Islam, while Milli Görüs is an expression of religious opposition. More so than Milli Görüs, the Diyanet strives towards a liberal and secular interpretation of Islam. It wants to enhance the Turkish-religious identity of immigrants without interfering with their participation in secular society (Doomernik, 1995). Milli Görüs, on the other hand, aims at the economic and social integration of the Turkish immigrant community as a whole: it is the community it wants to integrate and emancipate, not its individual members. Or, put differently, the emancipation of the individual is subordinate to that of the community (Manço, 1992:265). This perspective – the identification with a group that in a sense challenges the hegemony of Western culture – makes the organization rather appealing to the second generation.

Besides religious activities, Milli Görüs provides a whole range of educational and sociocultural activities for its members. Many of these initiatives are targeted specifically at youngsters. It organizes sports and recreational activities, and language courses, too. As Milli Görüs has a solid infrastructure at its disposal, in addition to well-equipped sports accommodation and comfortable meeting places, it has broad appeal. The organization also provides material support for its members in the form of scholarships and loans. More so than the Diyanet, it is oriented towards the situation in the host country (Sunier, 1996).

In Belgium's Moroccan community, the Islamic structures are influenced to a far lesser degree by the country of origin. In fact, they are often influenced by non-Moroccan movements (Lesthaeghe and Neels, 2000). Saudi Arabia, for example, financed the construction of the Great Mosque in Brussels and the establishment of the affiliated Islamic and Cultural Centre (ICC). Countercurrents, such as the Jama'a al Tabligh, which originated in Pakistan, were established later in Belgium. In the context of the second generation, it should be pointed out that this movement recruits young peo-

ple in particular. The Muslim Brotherhood, an organization originating in Egypt, has also become established in Belgium. Like the Jama'a al Tabligh, it emphasizes the project of re-Islamization and proselytism, and it shows an interest in recruiting second-generation Moroccan youngsters (Renaerts, 1996). On this basis, both movements may be considered to be exponents of Islamism.

Islamist movements provide their followers and society with concrete and detailed rules of conduct for daily living. Orthopraxis – *i.e.*, correct or orthodox religious praxis – is a convenient instrument for cultivating the distinction between oneself and “the other.” A study conducted among Turkish girls of the second generation, for example, found that several paid a great deal of attention to what they considered to be appropriate Islamic dress, food and home decoration. The girls also appeared to be very conscious of their own ‘Islamist’ way of life, their ‘orthopraxis,’ which they considered to be very different from life in surrounding society (Timmerman, 1999). Furthermore, some Muslims see adherence to the social rules prescribed by Islamism as a way of displaying their Islamic identity and inviting recognition. Such gestures ultimately become symbols marking the ethnic group (Barth, 1994:16). Not only external elements can be used to create distinctions; ideological differences can also serve this purpose.

Boys and girls are attracted to Islamism in different ways. The dominant role of men is central to an Islamist frame of reference. In the previously mentioned study on second-generation Turkish girls (Timmerman, 1999), it was found that not only older men, but younger ones too, are urged to take more seriously their responsibility for female relatives and, in particular, to guard their moral behavior. Young, mostly second-generation men often feel comfortable within an Islamist worldview (Timmerman, 1999). The immigration context is particularly harmful to the patriarchal role of young men in general (Kiray, 1982). As we have already mentioned, the socioeconomic position of most young men of the second generation is worse than that of their Belgian counterparts. Even more so than women, they are targets of racism (Timmerman, 1999). For these Muslim men who want to “re-legitimate” their male authority, the mosque may assume a new significance. Young immigrant men of the second generation who are seeking a more prestigious status in society are gratified by the new social concern that the Islamist frame of reference has to offer (Timmerman, 1994). An Islamist worldview succeeds in improving the status of boys in the public domain as well as within the family. Unlike for girls who opt for the Islamist perspective, their Islamist

public role does not stand in the way of participation in Western society (Timmerman, 1999; 2000a).

As future mothers, girls play a key role in the transmission of Islamist ideas. Moreover, according to Islamism, women embody Islamic authenticity most profoundly (Kandiyoti, 1995:308). Also, respect for Islamic family values forms the basis of a just society (Keddie, 1995). It is in this sense that girls and women are central to the Islamist worldview. Indeed, Islamist movements organize many activities for girls and women: sociocultural events, meetings, courses and sports activities (Manço, 1992). The Muslim woman is often perceived in the West as a backward, oppressed and pitiful being whose lot is apparent from her veiled appearance. On the other hand, it is quite noticeable how Islamic women themselves attach great importance to proper Islamic dress, *i.e.*, clothing that covers the entire body, including the face. Although women of the second generation often confirm the Western perception of the veiled Islamic female, they are mostly socially conscious and feel united in their mission to contribute towards the Islamization of 'modernity' (Timmerman, 1995, 2000a). Twenty years ago, it was unusual in Belgium to see young girls wear a headscarf. Today, young women in "Islamic dress" – most of them second generation – are a very visible group. It is quite noticeable that the new style of clothing among young, mostly second-generation Muslims differs both from Western attire and from traditional Islamic dress. Often it is an amalgamation of the two. Islamist dress may be regarded as a uniform symbolizing a transition: "Far from indicating that the wearers remain fixed in the world of tradition and the past, then, Islamist dress is the uniform of arrival, signaling entrance into, and determination to move forward in, modernity" (Ahmed, 1992:225). In a study conducted among Moroccan and Turkish women of the second generation, women asserted it gives them a greater degree of social freedom: it makes it easier for them to interact with male colleagues or fellow students without being branded as 'immoral' (Timmerman *et al.*, 1999). Through this style of dress, they are able to claim their own legitimate place in society outside the confines of the family. Women also use the headscarf as a means to escape from the traditional female environment and enter into the public domain (Ask and Tjomsland, 1998:12).

Unlike among educated boys, the attraction of Islamism is low among educated girls. Education improves the social status of a girl dramatically. It gives her an opportunity to occupy a position in the public domain of a Western society, besides her place within the family. This makes education, if it is

attainable, a very attractive goal for many Muslim girls of the second generation.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the studies surveyed, we conclude that the level of educational attainment among second-generation Moroccans and Turks is improving and that members of these groups are now more likely to move on to higher education. This trend is most visible among Moroccan youngsters, as their Turkish counterparts still tend to opt more easily for technical and vocational studies. Moreover, some Turkish girls are still married at a young age, which clearly affects their educational attainment. The success of second-generation Moroccans in education is remarkable, given that their parents are generally even less educated than the parents of their Turkish peers. Social mobility within two generations is considerable.

The educational gap with Belgian pupils and students is, however, still quite wide. This would appear to be due not only to obvious differences between the groups in terms of their socioeconomic backgrounds, but also to the concentration of immigrant pupils in certain schools. This affects the school climate, the motivation of teachers, and language acquisition on the part of the immigrant children concerned. Dropout rates in such concentration schools are high. A relatively high proportion of second-generation Moroccan boys leave school without diplomas. Some of these boys become marginalized. They constitute a highly visible group in the streets and attract attention. However, the group that does well or very well at school is twice as big. Many Moroccan and Turkish parents want their children to succeed at school, because they realize that they themselves were given little opportunity to study. They are eager for their children to make their immigration project a success in the long run.

This relatively positive development in the education of second-generation immigrants is not reflected in the labor market. The second generation is not well represented, and they are mostly employed in the less favorable segments of the job market. Since 1995, unemployment among the population of foreign origin has increased continuously, while the overall number of job-seekers has decreased spectacularly in recent years.

An interesting development among the second generation is the polarization that is occurring in relation to the significance of Islam. On the one hand, more and more youngsters of the second generation are opting for a more secular way of life, while on the other, a growing number are opting for

Islamist ideologies or at least for a more conscious form of Islam. This choice, however, is motivated differently by girls and boys, and education seems to be the most relevant factor in this respect. While girls who have studied can, because of their high educational status, choose legitimately to enter the Western secular sphere, this is not an option for girls who lack such high educational status. For the latter, the most convenient way of acquiring a socially acceptable place outside the traditional familial context is by joining an Islamist movement. In other words, educated girls have other options than turning to Islamism for manifesting themselves outside the traditional familial context. This, however, does not hold for boys. For young people of the second generation, who have little to hold on to socially, Islamism can provide a transparent, supportive and all-embracing frame of reference. Furthermore, the conditions that make Islam suitable as a discourse of protest against Western dominance also contribute towards its popularity. Islamism considers Islamic family values to be the foundation of a just society. Consequently, many young men, particularly of the second generation, feel comfortable within an Islamist worldview. They see it as a way of re-legitimizing their male dominance, which is under constant threat from Belgian society and because of their often weak socioeconomic status. Second-generation Muslim women find solace in Islamism because it emphasizes women as symbols of authenticity.

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